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Abstract
The combination of deep reinforcement learning and search at both training and
test time is a powerful paradigm that has led to a number of a successes in single-
agent settings and perfect-information games, best exemplified by the success
of AlphaZero. However, algorithms of this form have been unable to cope with
imperfect-information games. This paper presents ReBeL, a general framework for
self-play reinforcement learning and search for imperfect-information games. In
the simpler setting of perfect-information games, ReBeL reduces to an algorithm
similar to AlphaZero. Results show ReBeL leads to low exploitability in benchmark
imperfect-information games and achieves superhuman performance in heads-up
no-limit Texas hold’em poker, while using far less domain knowledge than any
prior poker AI. We also prove that ReBeL converges to a Nash equilibrium in
two-player zero-sum games in tabular settings.
1 Introduction
Combining reinforcement learning with search at both training and test time (RL+Search) has led to
a number of major successes in AI in recent years. For example, the AlphaZero algorithm achieves
state-of-the-art performance in the perfect-information games of Go, chess, and shogi [55].
However, existing RL+Search algorithms do not work in imperfect-information games because they
make a number of assumptions that no longer hold in these settings. An example of this is illustrated
in Figure 1a, which shows a modified form of Rock-Paper-Scissors in which the winner receives two
points (and the loser loses two points) when either player chooses Scissors [16]. The figure shows the
game in a sequential form in which player 2 acts after player 1 but does not observe player 1’s action.
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(1a) Variant of Rock-Paper-Scissors in which the op-
timal P1 policy is (R=0.4, P=0.4, S=0.2). Terminal
values are color-coded. The dotted lines mean P2 does
not know which node they are in.
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(1b) The P1 subgame when using perfect-information
one-ply lookahead search. Leaf values are determined
by the full-game equilibrium. There is insufficient
information for finding (R=0.4, P=0.4, S=0.2).
The optimal policy for both players in this modified version of the game is to choose Rock and Paper
with 40% probability, and Scissors with 20%. In that case, each action results in an expected value of
zero. However, as shown in Figure 1b, if player 1 were to conduct one-ply lookahead search as is
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done in perfect-information games (in which the equilibrium value of a state is substituted at a leaf
node), then there would not be enough information for player 1 to arrive at this optimal policy.
This illustrates a critical challenge of imperfect-information games: unlike perfect-information games
and single-agent settings, the value of an action may depend on the probability it is chosen, and more
generally may depend on the entire policy. Thus, existing RL+Search algorithms such as AlphaZero
are not sound in imperfect-information games. Recent AI breakthroughs in imperfect-information
games have highlighted the importance of search at test time [42, 13, 15, 39], but combining RL
and search during training in imperfect-information games has been an open problem. Other recent
imperfect-information game successes have relied on RL alone without leveraging search [4, 61].
This paper introduces ReBeL (Recursive Belief-based Learning), a general RL+Search algorithm that
converges to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Our method builds on prior work in
which the notion of “state” is expanded to include the probabilistic belief distribution of all agents
about what state they may be in, given the available common knowledge information and the policies
of all agents. Our algorithm trains a value network and a policy network for these states through
self-play reinforcement learning. Additionally, the algorithm uses the value and policy network for
search during self play.
Our goal in this paper is not to chase state-of-the-art performance by any means necessary. Instead,
our goal is to develop a simple, flexible, effective algorithm that leverages as little expert domain
knowledge as possible. Experimental results show that despite its simplicity, ReBeL is effective in
large-scale two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and defeats a top human professional
with statistical significance in the benchmark game of heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em poker while
using far less expert domain knowledge than any previous poker AI. In perfect-information games,
ReBeL simplifies to an algorithm similar to AlphaZero, with the major differences being that search
occurs over a fixed depth, the search policy is played for the entirety of the subgame rather than just
the next action, and the value network is trained using bootstrapping.
2 Related Work
At a high level, our framework resembles past RL+Search algorithms used in perfect-information
games [59, 56, 1, 55, 51]. These algorithms train a value network through self play. During training,
a search algorithm is used in which the values of leaf nodes are determined via the value function.
Additionally, a policy network may be used to guide search. These forms of RL+Search have
been critical to achieving superhuman performance in benchmark perfect-information games. For
example, so far no AI agent has achieved superhuman performance in Go without using search at
both training and test time. However, these RL+Search algorithms are not theoretically sound in
imperfect-information games and have not been shown to be successful in such settings.
A critical element of our imperfect-information RL+Search framework is to use an expanded notion of
“state”, which we refer to as a public belief state (PBS). PBSs are defined by a common-knowledge
belief distribution over states, determined by the public observations shared by all agents and the
known policies of all agents. PBSs can be viewed as a multi-agent generalization of belief states used
in partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [33]. The concept of PBSs originated
in work on decentralized multi-agent POMDPs [45, 47, 20] and has been widely used since then in
imperfect-information games more broadly [42, 21, 53, 31].
Our work most closely builds upon the poker AI DeepStack [42], in which a value function for
PBSs is used for search at test time. However, DeepStack’s value function was trained not through
self-play RL, but rather by generating random PBSs, including random probability distributions, and
estimating their values using search. This would be like learning a value function for Go by randomly
placing stones on the board. This is not an efficient way of learning a value function because the vast
majority of randomly generated situations would not be relevant in actual play. DeepStack coped with
this by using handcrafted features to reduce the dimensionality of the public belief state space, by
sampling PBSs from a distribution based on expert domain knowledge, and by using domain-specific
abstractions to circumvent the need for a value network when close to the end of the game.
An alternative approach for depth-limited search in imperfect-information games that does not use
a value function for PBSs was used in the Pluribus poker AI to defeat elite human professionals in
multiplayer poker for the first time [16, 15]. This approach trains a population of “blueprint” policies
without using search. At test time, the approach conducts depth-limited search by allowing each
agent to choose a blueprint policy from the population at leaf nodes. The value of the leaf node is the
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expected value of each agent playing their chosen blueprint policy against all the other agents’ choice
for the rest of the game. While this approach has been successful in poker, it does not use search
during training and therefore requires strong blueprint policies to be computed without search. Also,
the computational cost of the search algorithm is linear with the number of blueprint policies.
3 Notation and Background
We assume throughout this work that the rules of the game, as well as any models and algorithms
used by our agent, are common knowledge. However, the outcome of stochastic algorithms (i.e., the
random seeds) are not known.
Our notation is based on that of factored observation games [36] which is a modification of partially
observable stochastic games [27] that distinguishes between private and public observations. We
consider a game with N = {1, 2, ..., N} agents. We provide theoretical and empirical results only
for when |N | = 2, though related techniques have been shown to be successful in practice in certain
settings with more agents [15].
A world state w ∈ W is a state in the game. A = A1 ×A2 × ...×AN is the space of joint actions.
Ai(w) denotes the legal actions for agent i at w and a = (a1, a2, ..., aN ) ∈ A denotes a joint action.
After a joint action a is chosen, a transition function T determines the next world state w′ drawn from
the probability distribution T (w, a) ∈ ∆W . After joint action a, agent i receives a rewardRi(w, a).
Upon transition from world state w to w′ via joint action a, agent i receives a private observation
from a function Opriv(i)(w, a,w′). Additionally, all agents receive a public observation from a
function Opub(w, a,w′). Public observations may include observations of publicly taken actions by
agents. For example, in many recreational games, including poker, all betting actions are public.
A history (also called a trajectory) is a finite sequence of legal actions and world states, denoted
h = (w0, a0, w1, a1, ..., wt). An infostate (also called an action-observation history (AOH)) for
agent i is a sequence of an agent’s observations and actions si = (O0i , a
0
i , O
1
i , a
1
i , ..., O
t
i) where
Oki =
(Opriv(i)(wk−1, ak−1, wk),Opub(wk−1, ak−1, wk)). The unique infostate corresponding to a
history h for agent i is denoted si(h). The set of histories that correspond to si is denotedH(si).
A public state is a sequence spub = (O0pub, O1pub, ..., Otpub) of public observations. The unique public
state corresponding to a history h and an infostate si is denoted spub(h) and spub(si), respectively.
The set of histories that match the sequence of public observation of spub is denotedH(spub).
As an example, consider a game in which two players roll two six-sided dice each. One die of each
player is publicly visible, but the other die is only observed by the player who rolled it. Suppose
player 1 rolls a 3 and a 4 (with 3 being the hidden die), and player 2 rolls a 5 and a 6 (with 5 being
the hidden die). The history is h =
(
(3, 4), (5, 6)
)
. The set of histories corresponding to player 2’s
infostate is H(s2) =
{(
(x, 4), (5, 6)
) | x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}}, so |H(s2)| = 6. The set of histories
corresponding to spub isH(spub) =
{(
(x, 4), (y, 6)
) | x, y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}}, so |H(spub)| = 36 .
Public states provide an easy way to reason about common knowledge in a game. All agents observe
the same public sequence spub, and therefore it is common knowledge among all agents that the true
history is some h ∈ H(spub).2
An agent’s policy pii is a function mapping from an infostate to a probability distribution over
actions. A policy profile pi is a tuple (pi1, pi2, ..., piN ). We also define a policy for a history h as
pii(h) = pii(si(h)) and pi(h) = (pi1(s1(h)), pi2(s2(h)), ..., piN (sN (h))). The expected sum of future
rewards (also called the expected value (EV)) for agent i in history h when all agents play policy
profile pi is denoted vpii (h). The EV for the entire game is denoted vi(pi). A Nash equilibrium is
a policy profile such that no agent can achieve a higher EV by switching to a different policy [44].
Formally, pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for every agent i, vi(pi∗) = maxpii vi(pii, pi
∗
−i) where pi−i
denotes the policy of all agents other than i. A Nash equilibrium policy is a policy pi∗i that is part of
some Nash equilibrium pi∗.
2As explained in [36], it may be possible for agents to infer common knowledge beyond just public
observations. However, doing this additional reasoning is inefficient both theoretically and practically.
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4 From World States to Public Belief States
A perfect-information subgame is defined by a root world state w and all states that can be reached
from that point forward. In other words, it is identical to the original game except it starts at w. In
two-player zero-sum perfect-information games, every world state w has a unique value vi(w) for
each agent i defined by both agents playing a Nash equilibrium pi∗ in the subgame rooted at that world
state. While there might be multiple Nash equilibria in a subgame, they all result in the same EV for
the agents in a two-player zero-sum game. A typical goal of RL algorithms for perfect-information
games is to learn the value function Vi :W → R for each agent i mapping a world state to its value
in an equilibrium. With such a value function, one can find the optimal policy for a world state by
solving a depth-limited subgame that extends only for a limited number of actions in the future,
where the values of leaf states (that is, states that have legal actions in the full game but not in the
depth-limited subgame) are set according to the value function [54, 50].
However, world states and histories do not necessarily have unique values in imperfect-information
games because their values depend not just on the true state of the world, but also on what each agent
knows, what each agent knows about what the other agents know, etc. In other words, it depends on
the common knowledge [2] among the agents.
Public belief states (PBSs) generalize the notion of “state value” to imperfect-information games. A
PBS β is a common-knowledge probability distribution over histories in H(spub) for some public
state spub. In perfect-information games, PBSs reduce to histories, which in two-player zero-sum
games effectively reduce to world states.
Any PBS that can arise in play (i.e., that can arise from the agents playing some policy profile pi)
can always be described by a joint probability distribution over the agents’ possible infostates, given
some public state spub [47, 52]. That is, the probability of any history in the PBS can be computed
when given the joint probability distribution over infostates and the rules of the game. For example,
in poker a PBS consists of the player actions and public cards, along with a probability distribution
over possible hands for each player. Formally, let Si(spub) be the set of infostates that player i may
be in given a public state spub. Then PBS β = (spub,∆S1(spub), ...,∆SN (spub)).3
We can generalize the notion of “state value” to imperfect-information games by defining a subgame
to be rooted at a PBS.4 One interpretation of such a subgame is that at the start of the subgame a
history is sampled based on the joint probability distribution of the PBS, and then the game proceeds
as it would in the original game.
Just as in perfect-information subgames, the optimal agent policies in a subgame rooted at a PBS do
not depend on anything (policies, observations, etc.) that came before the PBS. Thus, a two-player
zero-sum subgame rooted at a PBS β has a unique value V1(β) =
∑
h∈H(spub(β))
(
p(h)vpi
∗
1 (h)
)
,
where spub(β) is the public state corresponding to β and pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame.
Since the game is zero-sum, V1(β) = −V2(β).
Just as one can compute an optimal policy in perfect-information games via search by learning a value
function for world states, we show that one can compute an optimal policy in imperfect-information
games via search by learning a value function V1 : B → R, where B is the continuous space of
PBSs. Existing depth-limited search algorithms for imperfect-information games require the EVs of
infostates for PBSs, rather than the value of the PBS as a whole [17, 42]. The EV of infostate si in β
assuming pi∗ is played is
vpi
∗
i (si|β) =
∑
h∈H(si)
p(h|si, β)vpi∗i (h)
Theorem 1 proves that infostate EVs for β under some Nash equilibrium pi∗ can be derived from Vi.
3Frequently, a PBS can be summarized even more compactly by discarding parts of the history that are no
longer strategically relevant. For example, in poker we do not need to track the entire history of actions when
given a probability distribution over each players’ hands. We just need to track the amount of money each player
has in the pot, the public board cards, and whether there were any bets in the current round.
4Past work defines a subgame to be rooted at a public state [17, 9, 43, 42, 12, 35, 36, 57, 52]. We break with
this definition because imperfect-information subgames rooted at a public state do not have well-defined values.
4
Theorem 1. Let V˜i be the extension of Vi to unnormalized belief distributions. For any (normalized)
belief β and any subgradient −g¯i of −V˜i(β) with respect to β, Vi(β) + g¯i · sˆi = vpi∗i (si|β) for some
Nash equilibrium policy pi∗, where sˆi is the unit vector in direction si.
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
Thus, in theory, learning V1 is sufficient for using the search algorithms in this paper. Nevertheless,
in practice we learn an infostate-value function vˆ : B → R|S1|+|S2| that directly approximates for
each si the average of the sampled vpi
∗
i (si|β) values produced by our RL+Search procedure at β.
Unlike the total PBS value V1(β), the infostate values may depend on which Nash equilibrium is
played in the subgame. Each execution k of our RL+Search algorithm may converge to a different
pi∗,k in β, so the samples of vpi
∗,k
i (β) may not be identical. Nevertheless, Theorem 2 states that
the average of valid samples of vpi
∗
k
i (β) corresponds to v
pi∗
i (β) for some other minimax policy pi
∗.
Therefore vˆ should approximate vpi
∗
i for some minimax policy.
Theorem 2. Let X be the vector of infostate EVs in PBS β corresponding to minimax policy profile
pi∗,X , and let Y be the vector of infostate EVs in β corresponding to minimax policy profile pi∗,Y .
Then λX + (1 − λ)Y is the vector of infostate EVs in β corresponding to minimax policy profile
λpi∗,X + (1− λ)pi∗,Y for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Given that agents play according to policy profile pi, the PBS that arises at public state spub, the
infostate si, and the history h is denoted βpispub , β
pi
si , and β
pi
h , respectively.
A depth-limited subgame is a subgame (again rooted at a PBS) that extends only for some limited
number of actions into the future. In this paper, search is performed over a fixed-size depth-limited
subgame (as opposed to Monte Carlo Tree Search, which grows the subgame as more search iterations
are performed [24]), and we assume that all histories sharing a public state are either all in the subgame
or all not in the subgame. A history z that has children in the full game but does not have children in
the subgame is a leaf node, and agent i receives a reward of vˆ(si(z)|βpiz ) at such a history, where pi
is the policy profile in the subgame. This means that the value of a leaf node is conditional on the
beliefs at that leaf node, which in turn are conditional on the policy in the subgame.
5 Self Play Reinforcement Learning and Search for Public Belief States
At a high level, ReBeL, shown in Algorithm 1, is similar to RL+Search algorithms used for perfect-
information games, but operating on PBSs rather than world states. At the start of the game, a
depth-limited subgame rooted at the initial PBS βr is generated. This subgame is solved (i.e., a Nash
equilibrium is approximated) by running T iterations of an iterative equilibrium-finding algorithm and
using the learned value network vˆ to approximate leaf values on every iteration. The infostate values
at βr are added as training examples for vˆ and (optionally) the policies in the subgame are added as
training examples for the policy network. Finally, a leaf node z is sampled and the process repeats
with the PBS at z being the new subgame root. Detailed pseudocode is provided in Appendix B.
Section 5.1 explains how to solve a depth-limited subgame, given a value network. Section 5.2 covers
in detail our self-play reinforcement learning algorithm that uses the techniques in Section 5.1 for
search. Section 5.3 describes how to improve these techniques by adding a policy network.
5.1 Search in a depth-limited imperfect-information subgame
There exist a number of iterative algorithms for solving imperfect-information games [6, 62, 30, 38,
37]. Our framework is flexible with respect to the choice of a search algorithm.
We assume that the search algorithm used is an iterative self-play algorithm. On each iteration t,
the algorithm determines a policy profile pit. Next, the value of every leaf node z is set according
to vˆ(si(z)|βp¯itz ) or vˆ(si(z)|βpi
t
z ), depending on the algorithm, where p¯i
t denotes the average policy
profile over iterations 1 to t. Given pit and the leaf node values, each infostate in βr has a well-defined
value. This vector of values, denoted vpi
t
(βr), is computed and stored. Next, the algorithm chooses a
new policy profile pit+1, and the process repeats for T iterations. For many algorithms, including
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) [62, 17, 42], the average policy profile p¯iT converges
to a Nash equilibrium as T →∞.
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Algorithm 1 ReBeL: RL and Search for Imperfect-Information Games
function SELFPLAY(βr, θv, θpi, Dv, Dpi) . βr is the current PBS
while !ISTERMINAL(βr) do
G← CONSTRUCTSUBGAME(βr)
p¯i, pitwarm ← INITIALIZEPOLICY(G, θpi) . twarm = 0 and pi0 is uniform if no warm start
G← SETLEAFVALUES(G, p¯i, pitwarm , θv)
v(βr)← COMPUTEEV(G, pitwarm )
tsample ∼ unif{twarm + 1, T} . Sample an iteration
for t = (twarm + 1)..T do
pit ← UPDATEPOLICY(G, pit−1)
p¯i ← t−1t p¯i + 1tpit
G← SETLEAFVALUES(G, p¯i, pit, θv)
v(βr)← t−1t v(βr) + 1t COMPUTEEV(G, pit)
if t = tsample then
β′r ← SAMPLELEAF(G, pit) . Sample a leaf PBS according to the new policies
Add {βr, v(βr)} to Dv . Add to value net training data
for β ∈ G do . Loop over the PBS at every public state in G
Add {β, p¯i(β)} to Dpi . Add to policy net training data (optional)
βr ← β′r
After solving a subgame rooted at PBS βr with an iterative algorithm that has run for T iterations,
the value vector (
∑T
t=1 v
pit(βr))/T is added to the training data for vˆ(βr).5
Prior work on search in imperfect-information games has used the CFR Decomposition (CFR-D)
algorithm [17, 42]. Appendix E introduces CFR-AVE, a modification of CFR-D that sets the value
of a leaf node z based on p¯it rather than pit, which addresses some weaknesses of CFR-D. Section 8
also shows experimental results for fictitious play (FP) [6].
5.2 Self-play reinforcement learning
Algorithm 1 learns values for PBSs through self play. After solving a subgame rooted at PBS βr,
the value vector for the root infostates is added to the training dataset for vˆ. Next, a leaf PBS β′r is
sampled and a new subgame rooted at β′r is solved. This process repeats until the game ends.
Since the subgames are solved using an iterative algorithm, we want vˆ to be accurate for leaf PBSs
on every iteration. Therefore, a leaf node z is sampled according to pit on a random iteration
t ∼ unif{0, T −1}, where T is the number of iterations of the search algorithm.6 To ensure sufficient
exploration, one agent samples random actions with probabilility  > 0.7 In CFR-D β′r = β
pit
z , while
in CFR-AVE and FP β′r = β
p¯it
z .
Eventually, a subgame rooted at β∗r is reached near the end of the game that does not contain leaf
nodes (i.e., the subgame is not depth-limited). vˆ will therefore learn correct values vpi
∗
(si|β∗r ) for
every root infostate si and for some Nash equilibrium pi∗ (except for an error term that disappears as
T → ∞). In the future, when β∗r is a leaf PBS of a different subgame, it will be possible to more
accurately compute the value of that subgame. In this way, accurate PBS values will “bubble up” the
game tree and vˆ will increase in accuracy over time.
Theorem 3 states that, with perfect function approximation, running Algorithm 1 will produce a value
network whose error is bounded by O( 1√
T
) after a finite amount of time for any PBS that could be
encountered during play, where T is the number of CFR iterations being run in subgames.
Theorem 3. Consider an idealized value approximator that returns the most recent sample of the
value for sampled PBSs, and 0 otherwise. Running Algorithm 1 with T iterations of CFR in each
subgame will, after a finite amount of time, produce a value approximator that has error of at most
C√
T
for any PBS that could be encountered during play, where C is a game-dependent constant.
5For some algorithms, including CFR-AVE and FP, an alternative is to add the value vector vp¯i
T
(βr).
6For FP, we pick a random agent i and sample according to (piti , p¯i
t
−i) to reflect the search operation.
7The algorithm is still correct if all agents sample random actions with probability , but that is less efficient
because the value of a leaf node that can only be reached if both agents go off policy is irrelevant.
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5.3 Adding a policy network
Algorithm 1 will result in vˆ converging correctly even if a policy network is not used. However, if a
policy network is not used then in the first several iterations t of running a search algorithm in the
subgames, p¯it may be very far from an equilibrium. Since, in some search algorithms, p¯it determines
the PBSs at the leaf nodes of a subgame, not using a policy network means the learned value network
must be accurate over a wide domain of PBSs. Additionally, adding an accurate policy network will
reduce the number of search iterations necessary to closely approximate a Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 can train a policy network Πˆ : β → (∆A)|S1|+|S2| by adding p¯iT (β) for each PBS β in
the subgame to a training dataset each time a subgame is solved (i.e., T iterations of CFR have been
run in the subgame). Appendix J describes our warm start technique, which is based on [11].
5.4 Algorithm behavior in perfect-information games
Perfect-information games can be viewed as a special case of imperfect-information games in which
public states are equivalent to histories, and therefore have the same value as world states. Since the
value of a leaf node in a perfect-information subgame does not depend on the policy in the subgame,
only one search iteration is required to solve a subgame.
Thus, in perfect-information games Algorithm 1 reduces to an algorithm similar to AlphaZero. The
major differences are that AlphaZero plays just a single action before solving a new subgame while
ReBeL plays the subgame policy until reaching a leaf node, and AlphaZero grows the size of the
subgame during search, and AlphaZero trains on the final reward received at the end of the game.
6 Playing According to an Equilibrium at Test Time
In perfect-information games, it is fairly trivial to compute an optimal policy once an exact value
function vˆ is computed. This is not the case in imperfect-information games. As an example of the
problem we seek to address, consider again the game of modified Rock-Paper-Scissors illustrated
in Figure 1a. Suppose that vˆ is perfect and we are now playing against a real opponent where we
are player 2. Suppose that player 1 has just acted, In order to now conduct search as player 2, our
algorithm requires a belief distribution over states. What should this belief distribution be?
An intuitive choice, which is referred to as unsafe search [26, 23], is to first run CFR for T iterations
for player 1’s first move (for some large T ) and eventually arrive at a player 1 policy such as
(R = 0.41, P = 0.39, S = 0.2). Unsafe search passes down the beliefs resulting from that policy, and
then computes our optimal policy as player 2. This would result in a policy of (R = 0, P = 1, S = 0)
for player 2. Clearly, this is not a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if our opponent knew we would end
up playing this policy (which we assume they would know since we assume they know the algorithm
we run to generate the policy), then they could counter us by playing (R = 0, P = 0, S = 1).
This problem demonstrates the need for safe search, which is a search algorithm that ensures we
play a Nash equilibrium policy in expectation. Importantly, it is not necessary for the policy that the
algorithm outputs to always be a Nash equilibrium. It is only necessary that the algorithm outputs a
Nash equilibrium policy in expectation. For example, in modified Rock-Paper-Scissors it is fine for
an algorithm to output a policy of 100% Rock, so long as the probability it outputs that policy is 40%.
All past approaches for conducting safe search introduce additional constraints to the search algorithm
to ensure the value of each infostate in the root PBS matches the value from vˆ [17, 43, 12, 57].
Those additional constraints ensures search approximates a Nash equilibrium if vˆ is accurate, but
the constraints also hurt performance in practice compared to unsafe search [17, 12] and greatly
complicate search, so they were never fully used in any competitive agent. Instead, all previous
search-based agents used unsafe search either partially or entirely [42, 13, 16, 15, 53].
Moreover, using a different algorithm for search at test time than was used for search during training
may result in encountering PBSs at test time that were not encountered during training and therefore
result in poor approximations for the value and policy network in a self-play agent.
We now prove that safe search can be achieved without any additional constraints by simply running
the exact same algorithm at test time that was used during training. Specifically, when conducting
search at test time we pick a random iteration and assume all agents play according to that iteration’s
policy profile for the entire subgame. This leads to a PBS leaf node, which defines a new subgame,
and the process repeats. Since the opponent does not know which iteration we selected, they are
not able to exploit our assumption about the belief distribution. Theorem 4, the proof of which is in
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Section I, states that this algorithm approximates a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, Theorem 4 states
that once a value network is trained according to Theorem 3, using Algorithm 1 at test time (without
off-policy exploration) will approximate a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4. If Algorithm 1 is run at test time with no off-policy exploration, a value network with
error at most δ for any leaf PBS that was trained to convergence as described in Theorem 3, and with
T iterations of CFR being used to solve subgames, then the algorithm plays a (δC1 + δC2√T )-Nash
equilibrium, where C1, C2 are game-specific constants.
In other words, the same algorithm we describe for training also approximates a Nash equilibrium at
test time. This result applies regardless of how the value network was trained and therefore can be
applied to prior algorithms that use PBS value functions [42, 53].
Since a random iteration is selected, there is a risk that we may select a very early iteration, or even
the first iteration, in which the policy is extremely poor. This can be mitigated by using modern
equilibrium-finding algorithms, such as Linear CFR [14], that assign little or no weight to the early
iterations that are played.
7 Experimental Setup
We measure exploitability of a policy pi∗, which is
∑
i∈N maxpi vi(pi, pi
∗
−i)/|N |. All CFR experi-
ments use alternating-updates Linear CFR [14]. All FP experiments use alternating-updates Linear
Optimistic FP, which is a novel variant we present in Appendix D.
We evaluate on the benchmark imperfect-information games of heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em
poker (HUNL) and Liar’s Dice. The rules for both games are provided in Appendix C. We also
evaluate our techniques on turn endgame hold’em (TEH), a variant of no-limit Texas hold’em in
which both players automatically check/call for the first two of the four betting rounds in the game.
In HUNL and TEH, we reduce the action space to at most nine actions using domain knowledge of
typical bet sizes. However, our agent responds to any “off-tree” action at test time by adding the
action to the subgame [16, 15]. The bet sizes and stack sizes are randomized during training. For
TEH we train on the full game and measure exploitability on the case of both players having $20,000,
unperturbed bet sizes, and the first four board cards being 3♠7♥T♦K♠.
For HUNL, our agent uses far less domain knowledge than any prior competitive AI agent. Addition-
ally, our AI agent is trained on all stack sizes between 5,000 and 25,000 chips, rather than just the
standard 20,000. Appendix F discusses the poker domain knowledge we leveraged in ReBeL.
We approximate the value and policy functions using artificial neural networks. Both networks are
MLPs with GeLU [29] activation functions and LayerNorm [3]. Both networks are trained with
Adam [34]. We use pointwise Huber loss as the criterion for the value function and mean squared
error (MSE) over probabilities for the policy. In preliminary experiments we found MSE for the value
network and cross entropy for the policy network did worse. See Appendix G for the hyperparameters.
We use PyTorch [48] to train the networks. We found data generation to be the bottleneck due to the
sequential nature of the FP and CFR algorithms and the evaluation of all leaf nodes on each iteration.
For this reason we use a single machine for training and up to 128 machines with 8 GPUs each for
data generation. We release an implementation8 for Liar’s Dice to showcase the algorithms.
8 Experimental Results
Figure 2 shows ReBeL, using a learned value network, reaches a level of exploitability in TEH
equivalent to running about 125 iterations of full-game tabular CFR. For context, top poker agents
typically use between 100 and 1,000 tabular CFR iterations [5, 42, 13, 16, 15].
Table 1 shows results for ReBeL in HUNL. We compare ReBeL to BabyTartanian8 [10] and Slumbot,
prior champions of the Computer Poker Competition, and the local best response (LBR) [41]
algorithm. We also present results against Dong Kim, a top human HUNL expert that did best among
the four top humans that played against Libratus. Kim played 7,500 hands. Variance was reduced
by using AIVAT [18]. ReBeL played faster than 2 seconds per hand and never needed more than 5
seconds for a decision.
8https://github.com/facebookresearch/rebel
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Figure 2: Convergence of different techniques in TEH. All subgames are solved using CFR-AVE. Perfect Value
Net uses an oracle function to return the exact value of leaf nodes on each iteration. Self-Play Value Net uses a
value function trained through self play. Self-Play Value/Policy Net additionally uses a policy network to warm
start CFR. Random Beliefs trains the value net by sampling PBSs at random.
Bot Name Slumbot BabyTartanian8 [10] LBR [41] Top Humans
DeepStack [42] - - 383± 112 -
Libratus [13] - 63 ± 14 - 147 ± 39
Modicum [16] 11 ± 5 6 ± 3 - -
ReBeL (Ours) 45 ± 5 9 ± 4 881 ± 94 165 ± 69
Table 1: Head-to-head results of our agent against benchmark bots BabyTartanian8 and Slumbot, as well as top
human expert Dong Kim, measured in thousandths of a big blind per game. We also show performance against
LBR [41] where the LBR agent must call for the first two betting rounds, and can either fold, call, bet 1× pot, or
bet all-in on the last two rounds. The ± shows one standard deviation. For Libratus, we list the score against all
top humans in aggregate; Libratus beat Dong Kim by 29 with an estimated ± of 78.
Table 2 shows ReBeL also converges to an approximate Nash in several versions of Liar’s Dice. Of
course, tabular CFR does better than ReBeL when using the same number of CFR iterations, but
tabular CFR quickly becomes intractable to run as the game grows in size.
Algorithm 1x4f 1x5f 1x6f 2x3f
Full-game FP 0.012 0.024 0.039 0.057
Full-game CFR 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
ReBeL FP 0.041 0.020 0.040 0.020
ReBeL CFR-D 0.017 0.015 0.024 0.017
Table 2: Exploitability of different algorithms of 4 variants of Liar’s Dice: 1 die with 4, 5, or 6 faces and 2 dice
with 3 faces. The top two rows represent baseline numbers when a tabular version of the algorithms is run on the
entire game for 1,024 iterations. The bottom 2 lines show the performance of ReBeL operating on subgames of
depth 2 with 1,024 search iterations. For exploitability computation of the bottom two rows, we averaged the
policies of 1,024 playthroughs and thus the numbers are upper bounds on exploitability.
9 Conclusions
We present ReBeL, an algorithm that generalizes the paradigm of self-play reinforcement learning
and search to imperfect-information games. We prove that ReBeL computes to an approximate Nash
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and demonstrate that it produces superhuman performance
in the benchmark game of heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em.
ReBeL has some limitations that present avenues for future research. Most prominently, the input to
its value and policy functions currently grows linearly with the number of infostates in a public state.
This is intractable in games such as Recon Chess [46] that have strategic depth but very little common
knowledge. ReBeL’s theoretical guarantees are also limited only to two-player zero-sum games.
Nevertheless, ReBeL achieves low exploitability in benchmark games and superhuman performance
in heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em while leveraging far less expert knowledge than any prior bot.
We view this as a major step toward developing universal techniques for multi-agent interactions.
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Broader Impact
We believe ReBeL is a major step toward general equilibrium-finding algorithms that can be deployed
in large-scale multi-agent settings while requiring relatively little domain knowledge. There are
numerous potential future applications of this work, including auctions, negotiations, cybersecurity,
and autonomous vehicle navigation, all of which are imperfect-information multi-agent interactions.
The most immediate risk posed by this work is its potential for cheating in recreational games such as
poker. While AI algorithms already exist that can achieve superhuman performance in poker, these
algorithms generally assume that participants have a certain number of chips or use certain bet sizes.
Retraining the algorithms to account for arbitrary chip stacks or unanticipated bet sizes requires more
computation than is feasible in real time. However, ReBeL can compute a policy for arbitrary stack
sizes and arbitrary bet sizes in seconds.
Partly for this reason, we have decided not to release the code for poker. We instead open source our
implementation for Liar’s Dice, a recreational game that is not played as competitively by humans.
The implementation in Liar’s Dice is also easier to understand and the size of Liar’s Dice can be more
easily adjusted, which we believe makes the game more suitable as a domain for research.
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A List of contributions
This paper makes several contributions, which we summarize here.
• RL+Search in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. Prior work has devel-
oped RL+Search for two-player zero-sum perfect-information games. There has also been
prior work on learning value functions in fully cooperative imperfect-information games [20]
and limited subsets of zero-sum imperfect-information games [31]. However, we are not
aware of any prior RL+Search algorithms for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information
games in general. We view this as the central contribution of this paper.
• Alternative to safe search techniques. Theorem 4 proves that, when doing search at test
time with an accurate PBS value function, one can empirically play according to a Nash
equilibrium by sampling a random iteration and passing down the beliefs produced by that
iteration’s policy. This result applies regardless of how the value function was trained and
therefore applies to earlier techniques that use a PBS value function, such as DeepStack [42].
• Subgame decomposition via CFR-AVE. We describe the CFR-AVE algorithm in Ap-
pendix E. CFR-D [17] is a way to conduct depth-limited solving of a subgame with CFR
when given a value function for PBSs. CFR-D is theoretically sound but has certain proper-
ties that may reduce performance in a self-play setting. CFR-AVE is a theoretically sound
alternative to CFR-D that does not have these weaknesses. However, in order to implement
CFR-AVE efficiently, in our experiments we modify the algorithm in a way that is not
theoretically sound but empirically performs well in poker. Whether or not this modified
form of CFR-AVE is theoretically sound remains an open question.
• Connection between PBS gradients and infostate values. Theorem 1 proves that all of
the algorithms described in this paper can in theory be conducted using only V1, not vˆ (that
is, a value function that outputs a single value for a PBS, rather than a vector of values
for the infostates in the PBS). While this connection does not have immediate practical
consequences, it does point toward a way of deploying the ideas in this paper to settings
with billions or more infostates per PBS.
• Fictitious Linear Optimistic Play (FLOP). Section D introduces FLOP, a novel variant
of Fictitious Play that is inspired by recent work on regret minimization algorithms [14].
We show that FLOP empirically achieves near-O( 1T ) convergence in the limit in both poker
and Liar’s Dice, does far better than any previous variant of FP, and in some domains is a
reasonable alternative to CFR.
B Pseudocode for ReBeL
Algorithm 2 presents ReBeL in more detail.
We define the average of two policies to be the policy that is, in expectation, identical to picking one
of the two policies and playing that policy for the entire game. Formally, if pi = αpi1 + (1− α)pi2,
then pi(si) =
(xpi1i (si)α)pi1(si)+(x
pi2
i (si)(1−α))pi2(si)
x
pi1
i (si)α+x
pi2
i (si)(1−α)
where xpi1i (si) is the product of the probabilities
for all agent i actions leading to si. Formally, xpii (si) of infostate si = (O
0
i , a
0
i , O
1
i , a
1
i , ..., O
t
i) is
xpii (si) = Πt(a
t
i).
C Description of Games used for Evaluation
C.1 Heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em poker (HUNL)
HUNL is the two-player version of no-limit Texas hold’em poker, which is the most popular variant
of poker in the world. For each “hand” (game) of poker, each player has some number of chips (the
stack) in front of them. In our experiments, stack size varies during training between $5,000 and
$25,000 but during testing is always $20,000, as is standard in the AI research community. Before
play begins, Player 1 commits a small blind of $50 to the pot and Player 2 commits a big blind of
$100 to the pot.
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Algorithm 2 ReBeL
function REBEL-LINEAR-CFR-D(βr, θv, θpi, Dv, Dpi) . βr is the current PBS
while !ISTERMINAL(βr) do
G← CONSTRUCTSUBGAME(βr)
p¯i, pitwarm ← INITIALIZEPOLICY(G, θpi) . twarm = 0 and pi0 is uniform if no warm start
G← SETLEAFVALUES(βr, pitwarm , θv)
v(βr)← COMPUTEEV(G, pitwarm )
tsample ∼ linear{twarm + 1, T} . Probability of sampling iteration t is proportional to t
for t = (twarm + 1)..T do
pit ← UPDATEPOLICY(G, pit−1)
p¯i ← t−1t+1 p¯i + 2t+1pit
G← SETLEAFVALUES(βr, pit, θv)
v(βr)← t−1t+1v(βr) + 2t+1 COMPUTEEV(G, pit)
if t = tsample then
β′r ← SAMPLELEAF(G, pit) . Sample a leaf PBS according to the new policies
Add {βr, v(βr)} to Dv . Add to value net training data
for β ∈ G do . Loop over the PBS at every public state in G
Add {β, p¯i(β)} to Dpi . Add to policy net training data (optional)
βr ← β′r
function SETLEAFVALUES(β, pi, θv)
if ISLEAF(β) then
for si ∈ β do . For each infostate si corresponding to β
v(si) = vˆ(si|β, θv)
else
for a ∈ A(β) do
SETLEAFVALUES(T (β, pi, a), pi, θv)
function SAMPLELEAF(G, pi)
i∗ ∼ unif{1, N}, h ∼ βr . Sample a history randomly from the root PBS and a random player
while !ISLEAF(h) do
c ∼ unif[0, 1]
for i = 1..N do
if i == i∗ and c <  then . we set  = 0.25 during training,  = 0 at test time
sample an action ai uniform random
else
sample an action ai according to pii(si(h))
h ∼ τ(h, a)
return βh . Return the PBS corresponding to leaf node h
Once players commit their blinds, they receive two private cards from a standard 52-card deck. The
first of four rounds of betting then occurs. On each round of betting, players take turns deciding
whether to fold, call, or raise. If a player folds, the other player receives the money in the pot and the
hand immediately ends. If a player calls, that player matches the opponent’s number of chips in the
pot. If a player raises, that player adds more chips to the pot than the opponent. The initial raise of
the round must be at least $100, and every subsequent raise on the round must be at least as large as
the previous raise. A player cannot raise more than either player’s stack size. A round ends when
both players have acted in the round and the most recent player to act has called. Player 1 acts first on
the first round. On every subsequent round, player 2 acts first.
Upon completion of the first round of betting, three community cards are publicly revealed. Upon
completion of the second betting round, another community card is revealed, and upon completion of
the third betting round a final fifth community card is revealed. After the fourth betting round, if no
player has folded, then the player with the best five-card poker hand, formed from the player’s two
private cards and the five community cards, is the winner and takes the money in the pot. In case of a
tie, the money is split.
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C.2 Turn endgame hold’em (TEH)
TEH is identical to HUNL except both players automatically call for the first two betting rounds, and
there is an initial $1,000 per player in the pot at the start of the third betting round. We randomize the
stack sizes during training to be between $5,000 and $50,000 per player. The action space of TEH is
reduced to at most three raise sizes (0.5× pot, 1× pot, or all-in for the first raise in a round, and 0.75×
pot or all-in for subsequent raises), but the raise sizes for non-all-in raises are randomly perturbed by
up to ±0.1× pot each game during training. Although we train on randomized stack sizes, bet sizes,
and board cards, we measure exploitability on the case of both players having $20,000, unperturbed
bet sizes, and the first four board cards being 3♠7♥T♦K♠. In this way we can train on a massive
game while still measuring NashConv tractably. Even without the randomized stack and bet sizes,
TEH has roughly 2 · 1011 infostates.
C.3 Liar’s Dice
Liar’s Dice is a two-player zero-sum game in our experiments, though in general it can be played
with more than two players. At the beginning of a game each player privately rolls d dice with f
faces each. After that a betting stage starts where players take turns trying to predict how many dice
of a specific kind there are among all the players, e.g., 4 dice with face 5. A player’s bid must either
be for more dice than the previous player’s bid, or the same number of dice but a higher face. The
round ends when a player challenges the previous bid (a call of liar). If all players together have at
least as many dice of the specified face as was predicted by the last bid, then the player who made the
bid wins. Otherwise the player who challenged the bid wins. We use the highest face as a wild face,
i.e., dice with this face count towards a bid for any face.
D Fictitious Linear Optimistic Play
Fictitious Play (FP) [6] is an extremely simple iterative algorithm that is proven to converge to a Nash
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. However, in practice it does so at an extremely slow rate.
On the first iteration, all agents choose a uniform policy pi0i and the average policy p¯i
0
i is set identically.
On each subsequent iteration t, agents compute a best response to the other agents’ average policy
piti = argmaxpii vi(pii, p¯i
t−1
−i ) and update their average policies to be p¯i
t
i =
t−1
t p¯i
t−1
i +
1
tpi
t
i . As
t→∞, p¯it converges to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games.
It has also been proven that a family of algorithms similar to FP known as generalized weak-
ened fictitious play (GWFP) also converge to a Nash equilibrium so long as they satisfy certain
properties [60, 40], mostly notably that in the limit the policies on each iteration converge to best
responses.
In this section we introduce a novel variant of FP we call Fictitious Linear Optimistic Play (FLOP)
which is a form of GWFP. FLOP is inspired by related variants in CFR, in particular Linear CFR [14].
FLOP converges to a Nash equilibrium much faster than FP while still being an extremely simple
algorithm. However, variants of CFR such as Linear CFR and Discounted CFR [14] still converge
much faster in most large-scale games.
In FLOP, the initial policy pi0i is uniform. On each subsequent iteration t, agents compute a best
response to an optimistic [19, 49, 58] form of the opponent’s average policy in which pit−1−i is given
extra weight: piti = argmaxpii vi(pii,
t
t+2 p¯i
t−1
−i +
2
t+2pi
t−1
−i ). The average policy is updated to be
p¯iti =
t−1
t+1 p¯i
t−1
i +
2
t+1pi
t
i . Theorem 5 proves that FLOP is a form of GWFP and therefore converges
to a Nash equilibrium as t→∞.
Theorem 5. FLOP is a form of Generalized Weakened Fictitious Play.
Proof. Assume that the range of payoffs in the game is M . Since piti = argmaxpii vi(pii,
t
t+2 p¯i
t−1
−i +
2
t+2pi
t−1
−i ), so pi
t
i is an t-best response to p¯i
t−1
−i where t < M
2
t+2 and t → 0 as t → ∞. Thus,
FLOP is a form of GWFP with αt = 2t .
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Figure 3: Exploitability of different algorithms of 4 variants of Liar’s Dice: 1 die with 4, 5, or 6 faces and 2
dice with 3 faces. For all games FLOP outperforms Linear FP, but does not match the quality of Linear CFR.
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Figure 4: Exploitability of different algorithms for Turn Endgame Hold’em.
E CFR-AVE: CFR Decomposition using Average Strategy
On each iteration t of CFR-D, the value of every leaf node z is set to vˆ(si(z)|βpitz ). Other than
changing the values of leaf nodes every iteration, CFR-D is otherwise identical to CFR. If T iterations
of CFR-D are conducted with a value network that has error at most δ for each infostate value, then
p¯iT has exploitability of at most k1δ + k2/
√
T where k1 and k2 are game-specific constants [42].
Since it is the average policy profile p¯it, not pit, that converges to a Nash equilibrium as t→∞, and
since the leaf PBSs are set based on pit, the input to the value network vˆ may span the entire domain
of inputs even as t→∞. For example, suppose in a Nash equilibrium pi∗ the probability distribution
at βpi
∗
z was uniform. Then the probability distribution at β
pit
z for any individual iteration t could be
anything, because regardless of what the probability distribution is, the average over all iterations
could still be uniform in the end. Thus, vˆ may need to be accurate over the entire domain of inputs
rather than just the subspace near βpi
∗
z .
In CFR-AVE, leaf values are instead set according to the average policy p¯it on iteration t. When a
leaf PBS is sampled, the leaf node is sampled with probability determined by pit, but the PBS itself is
defined using p¯it.
We first describe the tabular form of CFR-D [17]. Consider a game G′ and a depth-limited subgame
G, where both G′ and G share a root but G extends only a limited number of actions into the future.
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Suppose that T iterations of a modified form of CFR are conducted in G′. On each iteration t ≤ T ,
the policy pi(si) is set according to CFR for each si ∈ G. However, for every infostate s′i ∈ G′ \G,
the policy is set differently than what CFR would call for. At each leaf public state s′pub of G, we
solve a subgame rooted at βpi
t
s′pub
by running T ′ iterations of CFR. For each s′i in the subgame rooted
at βpi
t
s′pub
, we set pit(s′i) = p¯i
T (s′i) (where pi
t(s′i) is the policy for the infostate in G and p¯i
T (s′i) is the
policy for the infostate in the subgame rooted at βpi
t
s′pub
. It is proven that as T ′ →∞, CFR-D converges
to a O( 1√
T
)-Nash equilibrium [17].
CFR-AVE is identical to CFR-D, except the subgames that are solved on each iteration t are rooted at
βp¯i
t
s′pub
rather than βpi
t
s′pub
. Theorem 6 proves that CFR-AVE achieves the same bound on convergence to
a Nash equilibrium as CFR-D.
Theorem 6. Suppose that T iterations of CFR-AVE are run in a depth-limited subgame, where on
each iteration t ≤ T the subgame rooted at each leaf PBS βp¯its′pub is solved completely. Then p¯i
T is a
C√
T
-Nash equilibrium for a game-specific constant C.
CFR-AVE has a number of potential benefits over CFR-D:
• Since p¯it converges to a Nash equilibrium as t→∞, CFR-AVE allows vˆ to focus on being
accurate over a more narrow subspace of inputs.
• When combined with a policy network (as introduced in Section 5.3), CFR-AVE may allow
vˆ to focus on an even more narrow subspace of inputs.
• Since p¯it+1 is much closer to p¯it than pit+1 is to pit, in practice as t becomes large one can
avoid querying the value network on every iteration and instead recycle the values from a
previous iteration. This may be particularly valuable for Monte Carlo versions of CFR.
While CFR-AVE is theoretically sound, we modify its implementation in our experiments to make it
more efficient in a way that has not been proven to be theoretically sound. The reason for this is that
while the input to the value network is βp¯i
t
s′pub
(i.e., the leaf PBS corresponding to p¯it being played in G,
the output needs to be the value of each infostate si given that pit is played in G. Thus, unlike CFR-D
and FP, in CFR-AVE there is a mismatch between the input policy and the output policy.
One way to cope with this is to have the input consist of both βp¯i
t
s′pub
and βpi
t
s′pub
. However, we found this
performed relatively poorly in preliminary experiments when trained through self play.
Instead, on iteration t − 1 we store the output from vˆ(si|βp¯it−1s′pub ) for each si and on iteration t we
set vt(si) to be tvˆ(si|βp¯its′pub) − (t − 1)vˆ(si|β
p¯it−1
s′pub
) (in vanilla CFR). The motivation for this is that
pit = tp¯it− (t−1)p¯it−1. If vt(h) = vt−1(h) for each history h in the leaf PBS, then this modification
of CFR-AVE is sound. Since vt(h) = vt−1(h) when h is a full-game terminal node (i.e., it has no
actions), this modified form of CFR-AVE is identical to CFR in a non-depth-limited game. However,
that is not the case in a depth-limited subgame, and it remains an open question whether this modified
form of CFR-AVE is theoretically sound in depth-limited subgames. Empirically, however, we found
that it converges to a Nash equilibrium in turn endgame hold’em for every set of parameters (e.g., bet
sizes, stack sizes, and initial beliefs) that we tested.
Figure 5 shows the performance of CFR-D, CFR-AVE, our modified form of CFR-AVE, and FP in
TEH when using an oracle function for the value network. It also shows the performance of CFR-D,
our modified form of CFR-AVE, and FP in TEH when using a value network trained through self-play.
Surprisingly, the theoretically sound form of CFR-AVE does worse than CFR-D when using an oracle
function. However, the modified form of CFR-AVE does better than CFR-D when using an oracle
function and also when trained through self play.
We also trained a model on HUNL with training parameters that were identical to the one reported
in Section 8, but using CFR-D rather than CFR-AVE. That model lost to BabyTartanian8 by 10± 3
whereas the CFR-AVE model won by 9± 4. The CFR-D model also beat Slumbot by 39± 6 whereas
the CFR-AVE model won by 45± 5.
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Figure 5: Left: comparison of CFR-D, CFR-AVE, modified CFR-AVE, and FP using an oracle value network
which returns exact values for leaf PBSs. Right: comparison of CFR-D, modified CFR-AVE, and FP using a
value network learned through 300 epochs of self play.
E.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Our proof closely follows from [17] and [42].
Proof. Let Rt(si) be the (cumulative) regret of infostates si on iteration t. We show that the regrets
of all infostates in G′ are bounded by O(
√
T ) and therefore the regret of the entire game is bounded
by O(
√
T ).
First, consider the infostates in G. Since their policies are chosen according to CFR each iteration,
their regrets are bounded by O(
√
T ) regardless of the policies played in descendant infostates.
Next consider an infostate si ∈ G′ \G. We prove inductively that Rt(si) ≤ 0. Let βpit be the PBS
at the root of the subgame containing si in CFR-D, and βp¯i
t
be the PBS at the root of the subgame
containing si in CFR-AVE. On the first iteration, βpi
t
= βp¯i
t
. Since we assume CFR-AVE computes
an exact equilibrium in the subgame rooted at βp¯i
t
= βpi
t
, so Rt(si) = 0 on the first iteration.
Next, we prove Rt+1(si) ≤ Rt(si). We define a∗,t as
a∗,ti = argmax
ai
t∑
t′=0
vt
′
(si, ai) (1)
By definition of regret,
Rt+1(si) =
t+1∑
t′=0
(
vt
′
(si, a
∗,t+1
i )− vt
′
(si)
)
(2)
Separating iteration t+ 1 from the summation we get
Rt+1(si) =
t∑
t′=0
(
vt
′
(si, a
∗,t+1
i )− vt
′
(si)
)
+
(
vt+1(si, a
∗,t+1
i )− vt+1(si)
)
(3)
By definition of a∗,ti we know
∑t
t′=0 v
t′(si, a
∗,t+1
i ) ≤
∑t
t′=0 v
t′(si, a
∗,t
i ), so
Rt+1(si) ≤
t∑
t′=0
(
vt
′
(si, a
∗,t
i )− vt
′
(si)
)
+
(
vt+1(si, a
∗,t+1
i )− vt+1(si)
)
(4)
Since
∑t
t′=0
(
vt
′
(si, a
∗,t
i )− vt
′
(si)
)
is the definition of Rt(si) we get
Rt+1(si) ≤ Rt(si) +
(
vt+1(si, a
∗,t+1
i )− vt+1(si)
)
(5)
Since pit+1 = pi∗,t+1 in the subgame where pi∗,t+1 is an exact equilibrium of the subgame rooted at
βp¯i
t+1
, so pit+1 is a best response to p¯it+1 in the subgame and therefore vt+1(si, a
∗,t+1
i ) = v
t+1(si).
Thus,
Rt+1(si) ≤ Rt(si) (6)
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F Domain Knowledge Leveraged in our Poker AI Agent
The most prominent form of domain knowledge in our ReBeL poker agent is the simplification of the
action space during self play so that there are at most 8 actions at each decision point. The bet sizes
are hand-chosen based on conventional poker wisdom and are fixed fractions of the pot, though each
bet size is perturbed by ±0.1× pot during training to ensure diversity in the training data.
We specifically chose not to leverage domain knowledge that has been widely used in previous poker
AI agents:
• All prior top poker agents, including DeepStack [42], Libratus [13], and Pluribus [15],
have used information abstraction to bucket similar infostates together [32, 22, 7]. Even
when computing an exact policy, such as during search or when solving a poker game in its
entirety [25, 5], past agents have used lossless abstraction in which strategically identical
infostates are bucketed together. For example, a flush of spades may be strategically identical
to a flush of hearts.
Our agent does not use any information abstraction, whether lossy or lossless. The agent
computes a unique policy for each infostate. The agent’s input to its value and policy
network is a probability distribution over pairs of cards for each player, as well as all public
board cards, the amount of money in the pot relative to the stacks of the players, and a flag
for whether a bet has occurred on this betting round yet.
• DeepStack trained its value network on random PBSs. In addition to reducing the dimension-
ality of its value network input by using information abstraction, DeepStack also sampled
PBSs according to a handcrafted algorithm that would sample more realistic PBSs compared
to sampling uniform random. We show in Section 8 that training on PBSs sampled uniformly
randomly without information abstraction results in extremely poor performance in a value
network.
Our agent collects training data purely from self play without any additional heuristics
guiding which PBSs are sampled, other than an exploration hyperparameter that was set to
 = 0.25 in all experiments.
• In cases where both players bet all their chips before all board cards are revealed, past poker
AIs compute the exact expected value of all possible remaining board card outcomes. This
is expensive to do in real time on earlier rounds, so past agents pre-compute this expected
value and look it up during training and testing. Using the exact expected value reduce
variance and makes learning easier.
Our agent does not use this shortcut. Instead, the agent learns these “all-in” expected values
on its own. When both agents have bet all their chips, the game proceeds as normal except
neither player is allowed to bet.
• The search space in DeepStack [42] extends to the start of the next betting round, except
for the third betting round (out of four) where it instead extends to the end of the game.
Searching to the end of the game on the third betting round was made tractable by using
information abstraction on the fourth betting round (see above). Similarly, Libratus [12],
Modicum [16], and Pluribus [15] all search to the end of the game when on the third betting
round. Searching to the end of the game has the major benefit of not requiring the value
network to learn values for the end of the third betting round. Thus, instead of the game being
three “levels” deep, it is only two levels deep. This reduces the potential for propogation of
errors.
Our agent always solves to the end of the current betting round, regardless of which round it
is on.
• The depth-limited subgames in DeepStack extended to the start of the next betting round on
the second betting round. On the first betting round, it extended to the end of the first betting
round for most of training and to the start of the next betting round for the last several CFR
iterations. Searching to the start of the next betting round was only tractable due to the
abstractions mentioned previously and due to careful optimizations, such as implementing
CFR on a GPU.
Our agent always solves to the end of the current betting round regardless of which round it
is on. We implement CFR only on a single-thread CPU and avoid any abstractions. Since a
subgame starts at the beginning of a betting round and ends at the start of the next betting
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round, our agent must learn six “layers” of values (end of first round, start of second round,
end of second round, start of third round, end of third round, start of fourth round) compared
to three for DeepStack (end of first round, start of second round, start of third round).
• DeepStack used a separate value network for each of the three “layers” of values (end of first
round, start of second round, start of third round). Our agent uses a single value network for
all situations.
G Hyper parameters
In this section we provide details of the value and policy networks and the training procedures.
We approximate the value and policy functions using artificial neural networks. The input to the value
network consists of three components for both games: agent index, representation of the public state,
and a probability distribution over infostates for both agents. For poker, the public state representation
consists of the board cards and the common pot size divided by stack size; for Liar’s Dice it is the last
bid and the acting agent. The output of the network is a vector of values for each possible infostate of
the indexed agent, e.g., each possible poker hand she can hold.
We trained a policy network only for poker. The policy network state representation additionally
contains pot size fractions for both agents separately as well as a flag for whether there have been
any bets so far in the round. The output is a probability distribution over the legal actions for each
infostate.
As explained in section 7 we use Multilayer perceptron with GeLU [29] activation functions and
LayerNorm [3] for both value and policy networks.
For poker we represent the public state as a concatenation of a vector of indices of the board cards,
current pot size relative to the stack sizes, and binary flag for the acting player. The size of the full
input is
1(agent index) + 1(acting agent) + 1(pot) + 5(board) + 2× 1326(infostate beliefs)
We use card embedding for the board cards similar to [8] and then apply MLP. Both the value and
the policy networks contain 6 hidden layers with 1536 layers each. For all experiments we set the
probability to explore a random action to  = 25% (see Section 5.2). To store the training data we
use a simple circular buffer of size 12M and sample uniformly. Since our action abstraction contains
at most 9 legal actions, the size of the target vector for the policy network is 9 times bigger than one
used for the value network. In order to make it manageable, we apply linear quantization to the policy
values. As initial data is produced with a random value network, we remove half of the data from the
replay buffer after 20 epochs.
For the full game we train the network with Adam optimizer with learning rate 3× 10−4 and halved
the learning rate every 800 epochs. One epoch is 2,560,000 examples and the batch size 1024. We
used 90 DGX-1 machines, each with 8 × 32GB Nvidia V100 GPUs for data generation. We report
results after 1,750 epochs. For TEH experiments we use higher initial learning rate 4× 10−4, but
halve it every 100 epochs. We report results after 300 epochs.
For Liar’s Dice we represent the state as a concatenation of a one hot vector for the last bid and binary
flag for the acting player. The size of the full input is
1(agent index) + 1(acting agent) + ndicenfaces(last bid) + 2nfacesndice(infostate beliefs).
The value network contains 2 hidden layers with 256 layers each. We train the network with Adam
optimizer with learning rate 3 × 10−4 and halved the learning rate every 400 epochs. One epoch
is 25,600 examples and the batch size 512. During both training and evaluation we run the search
algorithm for 1024 iterations. We use single GPU for training and 60 CPU threads for data generation.
We trained the network for 1000 epochs. To reduce the variance in RL+Search results, we evaluated
the three last checkpoints and reported averages in table 2.
G.1 Human Experiments for HUNL
We evaluated our HUNL agent against Dong Kim, a top human professional specializing in HUNL.
Kim was one of four humans that played against Libratus [13] in the man-machine competition which
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Libratus won. Kim lost the least to Libratus. However, due to high variance, it is impossible to
statistically compare the performance of the individual humans that participated in the competition.
A total of 7,500 hands were played between Kim and the bot. Kim was able to play from home at
his own pace on any schedule he wanted. He was also able to play up to four games simultaneously
against the bot. To incentivize strong play, Kim was offered a base compensation of $1 ± $0.05x
for each hand played, where x signifies his average win/loss rate in terms of big blinds per hundred
hands played. Kim was guaranteed a minimum of $0.75 per hand and could earn no more than $2 per
hand. Since final compensation was based on the variance-reduced score rather than the raw score,
Kim was not aware of his precise performance during the experiment.
The bot played at an extremely fast pace. No decision required more than 5 seconds, and the bot
on average plays faster than 2 seconds per hand in self play. To speed up play even further, the
bot cached subgames it encountered on the preflop, flop, and turn. When the same subgame was
encountered again, it would simply reuse the solution it had already computed previously.
Kim’s variance-reduced score, which we report in Section 8, was a loss of 165 ± 69 where the ±
indicates one standard error. His raw score was a loss of 358± 188.
H Proofs Related to Value Functions (Theorems 1 and 2)
We start by proving some preliminary Lemmas. For simplicity, we will sometimes prove results for
only one player, but the results hold WLOG for both players.
For some policy profile pi = (pi1, pi2), let vpii (s1|β) : B → R|Si| be a function that takes as input a
PBS and outputs infoset values for player i at infoset s1.
Lemma 1. For fixed β and pi2, v
(pi1,pi2)
1 (s1|β) is identical for any pi1 that is a BR to pi2 if β1(s1) > 0.
Proof. pi∗1 is a BR therefore it must maximize V1 =
∑
s1
p(s1)v
pi
1 (s1). It can only do so by achieving
the unique maximum at each infoset s1 that occurs with positive probability.
Lemma 2. Let V pi21 (β) be player 1’s BR value at β assuming that player 2 plays pi2. V
pi2
1 (β) is
linear in β1.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1 along with the definition of V1,
V pi21 (β) =
∑
s1∈S1(spub)
β1(s1)v1(s1|β, (BR(pi2), pi2))
.
Lemma 3. V1(β) = minpi2 V
pi2
1 (β), and the set of pi2 that attain V1(β) at β0 are precisely the Nash
equilibrium policies at β0. This also implies that V1(β) is concave.
Proof. By definition, the Nash equilibrium at β is the minimum among all choices of pi2 of the value
to player 1 of her BR to pi2. Any pi2 that achieves this NE value when playing a BR is a NE policy.
From Lemma 2, we know that each V pi21 (β) is linear, which implies that V1(β) is concave since any
function that is the minimum of linear functions is concave.
Lemma 4. At any β, the set of maps v1 : S1 → R corresponding to Nash equilibrium policies pi∗
forms a convex set.
Proof. A mixture of Nash equilibrium policy profile is a coarse correlated equilibrium, which means
it’s a Nash equilibrium since the game is two-player zero-sum. Therefore the set of Nash equilibrium
policies is convex on the simplex.
Now, consider the map from infosets to values, using a normal form representation of the subgame:
vpi
∗
1 (s1|β) =
∑
h∈s1
p(h|β)pi∗1(a1)pi∗2(a2)v1(h|a1, a2) (7)
This map is continuous in pi∗, so the set of maps must also be convex.
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Figure 6: Illustration of Lemma 3. In this simple example, the subgame begins with some probability β(heads)
of a coin being heads-up, which player 1 observes. Player 2 then guesses if the coin is heads or tails, and wins if
he guesses correctly. The payoffs for Player 2’s pure strategies are shown as the lines marked piheads2 and pitails2 .
The payoffs for a mixed strategy is a linear combination of the pure strategies. The value for player 1 is the
minimum among all the lines corresponding to player 2 strategies, denoted by the solid lines.
Now we can turn to proving the Theorem.
Consider a function V˜1 that is an extension of V1 to unnormalized probability distributions over
S1 and S2; i.e. V˜i((spub, b1, b2)) = Vi((spub, b1/|b1|1, b2/|b2|1)). V˜i = Vi on the simplex of valid
beliefs, but we extend it in this way to R|s1|≥0 \~0 so that we can consider gradients w.r.t. p(s1).
We will use the term ‘supergradient’ to be the equivalent of the subgradient for concave functions.
Formally, g is a supergradient of concave function F at x0 iff for any x in the domain of F ,
F (x)− F (x0) ≤ g · (x− x0).
Also, superg(F ) = −subg(−F ).
Theorem (Restatement of Theorem 1). For any belief β1 and any supergradient g¯ of V˜1(β) with
respect to β1,
vpi
∗
1 (s1|β) = V1(β) + g¯ · sˆ1 (8)
for some Nash equilibrium policy pi∗, where sˆ1 is the unit vector in direction s1.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that V1(β) is a concave function of β, and its extension V˜ off the simplex is
constant perpendicular to the simplex, so V˜ is concave as well. Therefore the notion of a supergradient
is well-defined.
Furthermore, V1 is the minimum of a set of linear functions V pi21 (Lemma 3), so at each point β, V1 is
equal to V pi21 for one or more policies pi2 which are exactly the set of equilibrium policies at β. The
gradient of V pi21 is
∇β1V pi21 (β) = ∇β1
∑
s1∈S1(spub)
β1(s1)v
(BR(pi2),pi2)
1 (s1|β) (9)
=
∑
s1∈S1(spub)
sˆ1v
(BR(pi2),pi2)
1 (s1|β) (10)
(11)
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If there is only a single V pi21 (β) plane that intersects V1(β), then V1 lies on this plane and has a single
supergradient which is simply the gradient of V pi21 at this point
9.
Otherwise, V1(β) lies at an ‘edge’ defined by the intersection of planes corresponding to V pi21 (β) for
different equilibrium policies. The tangent plane for any supergradient at β1 lies within the convex
hull of these intersecting planes. By Lemma 4, the set of V pi21 planes is convex so any plane in this
convex hull corresponds to the value for some equilibrium pi∗. Therefore, any supergradient of V
corresponds to a∇β1V pi
∗
1 (β1) for some NE pi
∗ in the subgame.
Finally, let’s compute g · sˆ1 at some β1 on the simplex (i.e. |β1|1 = 1).
g = ∇β1/|β1|1V pi
∗
1 (spub, β1/|β1|, β2) ·
d
dβ1
(
β1
|β1|1
)
(chain rule) (12)
=
 ∑
s′1∈S1(spub)
sˆ′1v
pi∗
1 (s
′
1|β)
 · (|β1|1 − β1)/(|β1|1)2 (Eq. 11) (13)
=
 ∑
s′1∈S1(spub)
sˆ′1v
pi∗
1 (s
′
1|β)
 · (1− β1) (since |β1|1 = 1) (14)
=
∑
s′1∈S1(spub)
sˆ′1v
pi∗
1 (s
′
1|β)−
∑
s′1∈S1(spub)
β1(s
′
1)v
pi∗
1 (s
′
1|β) (15)
=
∑
s′1∈S1(spub)
sˆ′1v
pi∗
1 (s
′
1|β)− V1(β) (16)
g · sˆ1 = vpi∗1 (s1|β)− V1(β) (17)
And we’re done.
Theorem (Restatement of Theorem 2). Let X be the vector of infostate EVs in PBS β corresponding
to minimax policy profile pi∗X , and let Y be the vector of infostate EVs in β corresponding to minimax
policy profile pi∗Y . Then λX + (1− λ)Y is the vector of infostate EVs in β corresponding to minimax
policy profile λpi∗X + (1− λ)pi∗Y for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Proof. We focus on a single infoset EV, v1(s1|β, pi∗), and consider a normal form representation of
the subgame.
v
λpi∗X+(1−λ)pi∗Y
1 (s1|β) =
∑
h∈s1
p(h|β) (λpi∗X(a) + (1− λ)pi∗Y (a)) v1(h|a) (18)
= λ
∑
h∈s1
p(h|β)pi∗X(a)v1(h|a) + (1− λ)
∑
h∈s1
p(h|β)pi∗Y (a)v1(h|a) (19)
= λv
pi∗X
1 (s1|β) + (1− λ)vpi
∗
Y
1 (s1|β) (20)
This mixed joint policy can be played independently by each agent in a two-player zero-sum game,
since all coarse correlated equilibria are Nash equilibria. The interpolated policy is a minimax (Nash)
strategy, due to Lemma 4.
I Proofs Related to Subgame Solving (Theorems 3 and 4)
Theorem (Restatement of Theorem 3). Consider an idealized value approximator that returns
the most recent sample of the value for sampled PBSs, and 0 otherwise. Running Algorithm 1
9The supergradient of a differentiable function is only equal to its gradient in the interior, which is why we
exclude the boundary from the result, i.e. we only consider R|S1|>0 . This could be corrected with a more detailed
proof, but we don’t care about the boundary since CFR-AVE never assigns a probability of exactly 0 to any state.
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with T iterations of CFR in each subgame will, after a finite amount of time, produce a value
approximator that produces values that correspond to a C√
T
-equilibrium policy for any PBS that
could be encountered during play, where C is a game-dependent constant.
Proof. CFR [62] is an iterated self play algorithm whose average policy across iterations converges
to a Nash equilibrium. The key idea behind CFR is that it decomposes the regret minimization in the
full game into independent regret minimization problems at each information state. At each infostate
I , CFR minimizes the regret over the counterfactual value, that is the EV of taking action a at I
weighted by the probability of reaching Ii assuming player i plays to reach I and the opponent and
chance play their policies at iteration t. The central result of [62] is that the total regret RTi in the
game is bounded by the sum of the counterfactual regrets at each infostate RTi (I). [62] then proposes
an independent regret matching policy [28] of
pit+1i (si, ai) =

max{0,Rti(si,ai)}∑
a′
i
∈Ai(si) max{0,R
t
i(si,a
′
i)} if
∑
a′i∈Ai(si) max{0, R
t
i(si, a
′
i)} > 0
1
|Ai(si)| otherwise
(21)
at each infostate, whose external regret after T iterations is bounded by O(1/
√
T ). This leads to the
CFR bound
RTi ≤ ∆|Ii|
√
|Ai|/
√
T ,
where ∆ is the range of payoffs, |Ii| is the number of infostates, and |Ai| is the max number of
actions for player i.
A crucial property of CFR is that each regret minimization at I only depends on the counterfactual
values of each action at I . It doesn’t matter exactly what policy is performed at other infostates as
long as they have low regret.
Suppose we compute an -Nash equilibrium in a PBS βpi
t
. Then the values for the PBS correspond
to an (average) policy in βpi
t
that achieves at most  regret in I at time t.
Consider CFR run in a depth-limited subgame G. Let ILi be the infostates in leaf L, and IG
∗
i be the
infostates of G not in any leaf subgame. If the total regret at each leaf PBS βpitL at each iteration t is
bounded by |ILi |/
√
T then the total regret in G will be bounded by
RTi,G ≤ |IG
∗
i |/
√
T +
1
T
∑
L∈G
T∑
t=1
RT
i,βpi
t
L
(22)
= |IG∗i |/
√
T +
1
T
∑
L∈G
T∑
t=1
|ILi |/
√
T (23)
= |IG∗i |/
√
T +
∑
L∈G
|ILi |/
√
T (24)
= |IGi |/
√
T . (25)
In other words, if the O(1/
√
T ) regret bound holds at each leaf PBS βpi
t
L encountered during the
search in βG , then the regret bound also holds for the values computed in β. So now we must show
inductively that valid bounds are computed for each relevant PBS that may be encountered during
play.
Consider the naive algorithm that at each leaf node in a depth-limited subgame, recursively runs
the same CFR procedure in each leaf subgame βtL. This algorithm would would clearly obey the
regret bound in Equation 25 by sequentially solving O(t|spub|) PBSs. But what about the sampling
approach in Algorithm 1?
Every PBS solved during this naive scheme can be specified by a pair of a public state spub and a
sequence τ = (t1, t2, ..., tk)), denoting that this is the PBS at spub with beliefs that arise from pit1 at
the root PBS, pit2 at the second subgae on the path to spub, and so on. We call τ an iter-sequence.
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We define the "natural ordering" of iter-sequences to be the one that places all suffixes of τ before τ ,
and orders all prefixes lexicographially. E.g. for T = 2 and depth of 3, the natural ordering would be
(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1), (1, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2), (1, 2), (1), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2), (2, 2), (2).
Consider a PBS β with some iter-sequence τ . Suppose the value function for every PBS with an iter
sequence τ ′ < τ is "valid" at iteration j of Algorithm 1. Then CFR will be correct in all subgames
leading to β up to the relevant iteration. So with positive probability, at iteration j of Algorithm 1,
the sequence of leaf PBSs leading to β will be reached, and CFR will be evaluated in β. Furthermore,
the PBSs for all subgames of β are suffixes in the natural ordering, so values for all leaf nodes in
β will be "valid". Therefore, with positive probability, a correct value of β will be inserted into the
value function at this iteration of Algorithm 1. And all future computations of the value of β will also
be correct, so the value of β will always be valid after this point.
Order all PBSs encountered during this procedure (β1, ..., βN ) by natural ordering of their iter-
sequences. Suppose that on iter j of Algorithm 1, the value function is valid for (β1, ..., βk). Then
P (βk+1 sampled on iter m) is positive and independent on each iter m > j. Therefore by the second
Borel-Cantelli Lemma, limM→∞ Pr(βk+1 sampled on some iter j < m < M = 1. So each β will
eventually be sampled and produce a valid value estimate.
The only thing left to show is that any β encountered during play against the final policies generated
by this procedure will be in the set of {β} computed by Algorithm 1. The set of possible test-time
PBSs consist of those where the agent plays piT and the opponent plays an arbitrary policy. As
described in Section 5.2, leaf PBSs are sampled at a random t ≤ T for a public state reached by one
player playing pit and the other playing a uniform policy with probability  (and pit otherwise). So it
will sample every βpi
T
L for any L as long as it’s in the support of pi
T for at least one player. This is a
superset of all leaf nodes that may be encountered when the agent plays piT at test time.
Theorem (Restatement of Theorem 4). If Algorithm 1 is run at test time with no off-policy exploration,
a value network that has error at most δ for any leaf PBS, and with T iterations of CFR being used
to solve subgames, then the algorithm plays a (δC1 + δC2√T )-Nash equilibrium, where C1, C2 are
game-specific constants.
Proof. We prove the theorem inductively. Consider first a subgame near the end of the game that is
not depth-limited. I.e., it has no leaf nodes. Clearly, the policy pi∗ that Algorithm 1 using CFR plays
in expectation is a k1√
T
-Nash equilibrium for game-specific constant k1 in this subgame.
Rather than play the average policy over all T iterations p¯iT , one can equivalently pick a random
iteration t ∼ uniform{1, T} and play according to pit, the policy on iteration t. This algorithm is
also a k1√
T
-Nash equilibrium in expectation.
Next, consider a depth-limited subgame G such that for any leaf PBS βt on any CFR iteration t, the
policy that Algorithm 1 plays in the subgame rooted at βt is in expectation a δ-Nash equilibrium in
the subgame. If one computes a policy for G using tabular CFR-D [17] (or, as discussed in Section E,
using CFR-AVE), then by Theorem 2 in [17], the average policy over all iterations is k2δ+ k3√T -Nash
equilibrium.
Just as before, rather than play according to this average policy p¯iT , one can equivalently pick a
random iteration t ∼ uniform{1, T} and play according to pit. Doing so would also result in a
k2δ +
k3√
T
-Nash equilibrium in expectation. This is exactly what Algorithm 1 does.
Since there are a finite number of “levels” in a game, which is a game-specific constant, Algorithm 1
plays according to a δC1 + δC2√T -Nash equilibrium.
J CFR Warm Start Algorithm Used
Our warm start technique for CFR is based on [11], which requires only a policy profile to warm start
CFR soundly. That techniques computes a “soft” best response to the policy profile, which results in
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instantaneous regrets for each infostate. Those instantaneous regrets are scaled up to be equivalent
to some number of CFR iterations. However, that technique requires careful parameter tuning to
achieve good performance in practice.
We instead use a simplified warm start technique in which an exact best response to the policy profile
is computed. That best response results in instantaneous regrets at each infostate. Those regrets are
scaled up by a factor of 15 to imitate 15 CFR iterations. Similarly, the average policy effectively
assumes that the warm start policy was played for the first 15 iterations of CFR. CFR then proceeds
as if 15 iterations have already occurred.
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